Saturday, November 05, 2005
Election Woes: Proposition 77
This proposition would amend the State constitution to change the way in which legislative districts are determined. Instead of allowing the Legislature set the boundaries of Congressional, State Senatorial, State Assembly, and Board of Equalization districts, these boundaries would be set by a panel of three retired judges. The proposition specifies a procedure of choosing a panel that will not be biased in favor of either major political party. For further details on how the panel is chosen, go to the web site of the California Secretary of State: http://www.ss.ca.gov and find the information about the election in November, 2005.
The best argument for this method of redistricting the State is that it would create districts that are more competitive than they are now. In theory at least, candidates in a competitive district would have to take seriously the concerns and complaints of all factions in the district, not merely those who tend to vote for the incumbent. Representatives would have to try to represent all their constituents, not merely their political supporters.
Another argument is the existing set of district boundaries, established after the 2000 census. Districts were distorted into weird shapes to make it easier for incumbents of each major party to be reelected. The result was that in the 2002 election, every incumbent running for reelection was elected. There was no competition. Republicans felt safe to be Republicans; Democrats to be Democrats. One can argue that there was little incentive for members of either Party to compromise.
Of course, that’s only a partial truth. The argument that “safe” districts produce a legislature in which compromise is impossible omits the effect of party discipline. Even in a safe district, a candidate has to spend a large sum of money just to present his message to the voters. California legislative districts are the largest in the country. State Senate districts contain more than eight hundred thousand inhabitants. Assembly districts contain half that many. It is, therefore, unusually expensive to run for office in California. Party discipline comes into effect when the Party chooses which candidates to support. Candidates, including incumbents running for reelection, are more likely to receive this support if they agree to support the Party’s position on several key issues, such as reducing taxes on the wealthy. The effect of party discipline and support would be just as strong, if not even stronger, if all districts were competitive.
I have another reason for my skepticism about this initiative: Mr. Schwarzenegger supports it. He believes that a redistricted legislature would be one more willing to do his bidding. I don’t know why he would believe that, since Democrats in California outnumber Republicans, and a fair apportionment of legislative districts would produce a legislature with about the same ratio of Democrats to Republicans as we have now. There may be something else involved. His criticism of the present apportionment includes “horrible examples” of weirdly shaped districts.
Let us suppose that the proposition passes and that a panel of three non-partisan judges draws up legislative boundaries that show nicely shaped districts, mostly rectangular in shape. Since these judges are truly non-partisan, they do not pay any attention at all to the party affiliations of the residents. The result is apt to be a number of districts in the cores of our big cities (Los Angeles and San Francisco) that are very strongly Democratic. Some of these core districts will be more than 80 percent Democratic. Most other districts will consist of rural and small city areas in which the majority of residents tend to be Republicans. We would then have a few districts that are 80 percent Democratic and the others 55 to 60 percent Republican. The result of this “fair” redistricting would produce a majority of Republicans in the legislature, in spite of the fact that Democrats outnumber Republicans among the State’s population.
My skepticism has led me to vote against this initiative. I hope my California readers do the same.
The best argument for this method of redistricting the State is that it would create districts that are more competitive than they are now. In theory at least, candidates in a competitive district would have to take seriously the concerns and complaints of all factions in the district, not merely those who tend to vote for the incumbent. Representatives would have to try to represent all their constituents, not merely their political supporters.
Another argument is the existing set of district boundaries, established after the 2000 census. Districts were distorted into weird shapes to make it easier for incumbents of each major party to be reelected. The result was that in the 2002 election, every incumbent running for reelection was elected. There was no competition. Republicans felt safe to be Republicans; Democrats to be Democrats. One can argue that there was little incentive for members of either Party to compromise.
Of course, that’s only a partial truth. The argument that “safe” districts produce a legislature in which compromise is impossible omits the effect of party discipline. Even in a safe district, a candidate has to spend a large sum of money just to present his message to the voters. California legislative districts are the largest in the country. State Senate districts contain more than eight hundred thousand inhabitants. Assembly districts contain half that many. It is, therefore, unusually expensive to run for office in California. Party discipline comes into effect when the Party chooses which candidates to support. Candidates, including incumbents running for reelection, are more likely to receive this support if they agree to support the Party’s position on several key issues, such as reducing taxes on the wealthy. The effect of party discipline and support would be just as strong, if not even stronger, if all districts were competitive.
I have another reason for my skepticism about this initiative: Mr. Schwarzenegger supports it. He believes that a redistricted legislature would be one more willing to do his bidding. I don’t know why he would believe that, since Democrats in California outnumber Republicans, and a fair apportionment of legislative districts would produce a legislature with about the same ratio of Democrats to Republicans as we have now. There may be something else involved. His criticism of the present apportionment includes “horrible examples” of weirdly shaped districts.
Let us suppose that the proposition passes and that a panel of three non-partisan judges draws up legislative boundaries that show nicely shaped districts, mostly rectangular in shape. Since these judges are truly non-partisan, they do not pay any attention at all to the party affiliations of the residents. The result is apt to be a number of districts in the cores of our big cities (Los Angeles and San Francisco) that are very strongly Democratic. Some of these core districts will be more than 80 percent Democratic. Most other districts will consist of rural and small city areas in which the majority of residents tend to be Republicans. We would then have a few districts that are 80 percent Democratic and the others 55 to 60 percent Republican. The result of this “fair” redistricting would produce a majority of Republicans in the legislature, in spite of the fact that Democrats outnumber Republicans among the State’s population.
My skepticism has led me to vote against this initiative. I hope my California readers do the same.
