Monday, November 29, 2004
Do we need an Intelligence Czar?
For the time being, the bill to create a single person to allocate budgets and facilitate information exchange among the ten or fifteen separate intelligence agencies has been stalled in the House of Representatives. It seems like a good idea to pause and ponder the question of whether we need an Intelligence Czar.
What is the problem that an IC might solve? As near as I can tell, the primary concern is that there may be another attack on the United States, similar in awfulness to the disaster of September 11, 2001. It is the belief of many that such an attack could have been prevented if all the intelligence agencies had pooled their information and if the data provided had been analyzed properly.
This argument seems to me like arguing that bank robberies could be avoided if only all the police forces in the nation pooled and thoroughly analyzed all the information they had relating to banks and potential robbers. Bank robberies, like many other crimes, can not be anticipated and prevented with certainty. The police and other authorities are left with the task of catching the robbers and punishing them after the fact. That is not to say that police departments are wasting their time in accumulating and analyzing data on bank robberies and robbers. The police do what they can. However, we live in a free society and resist any attempt by the police or any other government agency to spy on us and record everything we do. For, to prevent all bank robberies, the police would have to keep track of all potential bank robbers, not merely the known ones. Every one of us must be considered a potential bank robber.
The same argument applies to terrorist organizations and plots. We can not prevent all terrorist attacks, but perhaps we can prevent a few of them. It is worth while trying to coordinate the efforts of our many intelligence-gathering organizations, pooling data, and analyzing the information thoroughly and objectively. However, just as any American would have to be considered a potential bank robber, so any person living anywhere in the world would have to be considered a potential terrorist. Terrorism thrives by the recruiting of new terrorists.
Another argument in favor of an Intelligence Czar is the misinterpretation of available information regarding Iraq’s military capabilities before the start of the current war. Questionable or uncertain information was used to convince the American Public that Iraq was a grave military threat. We now know that Iraq was not, in fact, any longer a serious threat. We know that information was available publicly from the UN Inspectors that Iraq was not a threat, but that such information was ignored by the Bush Administration. If there had been an Intelligence Czar, would the Administration not have been misled? I think not. Anything the IC told the President or his advisors would have been classified and not available to the public. If the President chose to ignore or to misuse the information, the IC could not publicly contradict the President.
We have intelligence problems. I don’t see that having an Intelligence Czar would solve any of them. What we need is a President who doubts and who looks at all interpretations of the available intelligence and not merely the interpretation that he likes. What we need is a National Security Advisor who is a real skeptic and an honest advisor to the President, not one who is a long-time friend and cheer-leader. What we need most of all is a public that is informed about the successes and failings of our intelligence organizations and, in particular, about what information was available to the President and what he chose to do with it.
What is the problem that an IC might solve? As near as I can tell, the primary concern is that there may be another attack on the United States, similar in awfulness to the disaster of September 11, 2001. It is the belief of many that such an attack could have been prevented if all the intelligence agencies had pooled their information and if the data provided had been analyzed properly.
This argument seems to me like arguing that bank robberies could be avoided if only all the police forces in the nation pooled and thoroughly analyzed all the information they had relating to banks and potential robbers. Bank robberies, like many other crimes, can not be anticipated and prevented with certainty. The police and other authorities are left with the task of catching the robbers and punishing them after the fact. That is not to say that police departments are wasting their time in accumulating and analyzing data on bank robberies and robbers. The police do what they can. However, we live in a free society and resist any attempt by the police or any other government agency to spy on us and record everything we do. For, to prevent all bank robberies, the police would have to keep track of all potential bank robbers, not merely the known ones. Every one of us must be considered a potential bank robber.
The same argument applies to terrorist organizations and plots. We can not prevent all terrorist attacks, but perhaps we can prevent a few of them. It is worth while trying to coordinate the efforts of our many intelligence-gathering organizations, pooling data, and analyzing the information thoroughly and objectively. However, just as any American would have to be considered a potential bank robber, so any person living anywhere in the world would have to be considered a potential terrorist. Terrorism thrives by the recruiting of new terrorists.
Another argument in favor of an Intelligence Czar is the misinterpretation of available information regarding Iraq’s military capabilities before the start of the current war. Questionable or uncertain information was used to convince the American Public that Iraq was a grave military threat. We now know that Iraq was not, in fact, any longer a serious threat. We know that information was available publicly from the UN Inspectors that Iraq was not a threat, but that such information was ignored by the Bush Administration. If there had been an Intelligence Czar, would the Administration not have been misled? I think not. Anything the IC told the President or his advisors would have been classified and not available to the public. If the President chose to ignore or to misuse the information, the IC could not publicly contradict the President.
We have intelligence problems. I don’t see that having an Intelligence Czar would solve any of them. What we need is a President who doubts and who looks at all interpretations of the available intelligence and not merely the interpretation that he likes. What we need is a National Security Advisor who is a real skeptic and an honest advisor to the President, not one who is a long-time friend and cheer-leader. What we need most of all is a public that is informed about the successes and failings of our intelligence organizations and, in particular, about what information was available to the President and what he chose to do with it.
